The paper provides a summary account of the views of the classical political economists on the effects of technical change on the demand for labour, and in particular for skilled versus unskilled labour. The views of the classical economic theorists, from Smith to Ricardo, Babbage, Ure and Marx, are then contrasted with the historical record of the bias of technical change with regard to de-qualifying and skill-enhancing tendencies in the 18th and 19th century that emerges from studies of economic historians. The paper shows that some of the classical economists made a serious effort to account for heterogeneous labour in a changing technical environment. While Smith and Marx envisaged the de-qualification of the workforce as the main characteristic of technological development and as a purposely intended consequence of the introduction of new technologies, other authors like Babbage also took into account capital -skilled labour complementarities and skill-enhancing effects of technological change. While for Smith the deskilling bias is a by-product of progress, Marx and Ure regarded directed technological change as a bourgeois weapon in the class struggle for the reduction of the bargaining power of the proletariat. Economic historians found strong confirmation for Marx's hypotheses that technical change was used as a weapon against the proletariat. But most empirical studies found no evidence for a deskilling tendency of industrialization as a whole. According to those studies industrialization was accompanied by a polarization of labour. On the one hand, industrialization deskilled part of the labour force and on the other hand it sharply raised the demand for highly skilled workers. Abstract. The paper provides a summary account of the views of the classical political economists on the effects of technical change on the demand for labour, and in particular for skilled versus unskilled labour.
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Introduction
In the context of the so-called "new growth theory" there has been a renaissance of economic discussions on biased technological change. Many recent studies deal with the question whether increasing wage premiums for skilled workers can be explained by skill-biased technological change (see Brugger/Gehrke 2017). The argument is that an increasing supply of skilled labour has induced profit-maximizing capital goods producers to search more intensively for new machines or technologies that are complementary to skilled labour. Due to the more widespread use of skilled labour complementary capital goods the relative demand for skilled labour increased and therefore the skill premium rose. Hence skill-biased technical change functions as a possible explanation for the conundrum that skill supply and skill premiums increased in tandem.
While these studies mainly focus on technological change in the 20 th and 21 st centuries, it is suggested in many of those contributions (Acemoglu 1998; 2002; Goldin/Katz 1998; Funk/Vogel 2004; Baedo 2007) that in the 19 th century technical change was predominantly deskilling, but that things have changed since then. "Stories" on how the shift from smallscale artisanal production to large-scale factory production led to the replacement of highskilled artisans by unskilled factory workers, frequently women and children, are the main source of evidence for the presumption that in the 19 th century technical change must have been deskilling in nature. However, gut-wrenching stories about 19 th century working conditions are helpful to understand the inhumane and dreadful conditions under which large parts of the population had to work and live, but may be bad guides for ascertaining the technical change bias. Accounts based on "realistic stories" of contemporary fiction writers such as Thomas Carlyle, Charles Dickens, William Morris, and John Ruskin, the existence of highly visible losers and hidden winners (Manning 2004) , and the reliance on indirect empirical evidence based on "indicators" and "approximations" (Bessen 2012), may give a misleading picture of the 19 th century technical change bias.
Besides accounts provided by fiction writers, there are also some more scientific sources, such as Friedrich Engels' study on The condition of the working-class in England in 1844 (1892 [1845] ), on the deskilling tendencies of the industrialisation process. Moreover, technical change and its effects on wealth, consumption, employment and income distribution was also one of the key themes in the writings of the contemporary classical economic theorists.
Beginning with Adam Smith -and even before him the topic was analysed already by James Steuart -the discussion on which social classes are potential winners and losers of technical progress has been a core theme for classical economists. Adam Smith's discussion of the causes and effects of the increasing division of labour was followed by the compensation debates between Say, Malthus, Sismondi and McCulloch, until Ricardo and Marx opened with their contributions on the machinery problem one of the longest and most intensive debates in the history of economic theory. But in most of thesestudies an analytical framework with homogenous labour was for simplicity employed -this holds in particular for the much discussed contributions of Ricardo and Marx on the machinery problem.
However, most classical economists were aware of the fact that labour displacement and compensation are not the only important aspects of the impact of technical change on the conditions of workers. Even if innovations do not lead to mass unemployment, they nevertheless change employments dramatically -in terms of working conditions, demands for professional skills, bargaining positions, etc. In the works of Adam Smith, John R.
McCulloch, Jean-Baptiste Say, Andrew Ure, Charles Babbage, and Karl Marx we find at least some hints on how, when, and why technical change is likely to increase, diminish or shift the demand for skilled and unskilled labour. It may be due to the fact that classical economics is so closely associated with the labour theory of value that while the contributions of the classical economists on the machinery problem, in which labour is generally treated as homogenous, have been extensively discussed, classical contributions on heterogeneous labour, such as skill-or unskilled-biased technical change, are almost forgotten.
In the recent literature on biased technical change it is generally assumed that the innovation bias is induced by (changing) relative factor endowments. According to Acemoglu (1998) , whose contributions have been seminal, an increase in the supply of skilled labour increases the demand for capital goods which are skilled labour complements, and therefore makes the development of skilled labour complementary machines more profitable for capital goods producers. Hence, it is the relative factor endowment (with skilled and unskilled labour), and its change over time, which determines the observed bias of technological change. Other social factors, like the bargaining power of different groups of workers and the class struggle, play no role in the search for new techniques in the recent literature on biased technical change. Some of the classical economists argued, however, that the bargaining power of skilled labourers was a major incentive for capitalists to invent and adopt techniques which are less skill-intensive, in order to break the skilled workers' bargaining power.
The purpose of this article is to review the views of the classical economists on skill-biased technical change and its induction, and to contrast these views with the available empirical evidence. Accordingly, we investigate the empirical evidence for the view prevailing among modern growth theorists that before the 20 th century technical change was predominantly deskilling in nature and look at what contemporary political economists tell us about the claim that progress was predominantly deskilling during their lifetimes. In addition, we also discuss the classical economists' views about possible "inducement mechanisms" that might have led to technological changes with a particular bias.
The Classical Economists' Contributions to Skill-Biased Technological Change
In modern growth theory skill-biased technical change (SBTC) is defined as a shift in the production function which favors skilled over unskilled labour: It is a non-neutral technological change which increases the relative marginal productivity, and therefore also the relative wage, of skilled labour. Accordingly, an increase in the relative wage of skilled labour, that is, an increase in the so-called "college premium" or "skill premium", can ceteris paribus serve as an indicator of skill-biased technical change. Empirically, skill-biased technical change is usually measured residually by assuming an aggregate production function with capital (K) and labour (L) as inputs, in which the labour input, L, is specified as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of skilled and unskilled labour with factorspecific productivities. From time series data on relative wages and on relative factor supplies, this modified Solovian production function can then be used, with a given estimate of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour, in order to calculate the skill-biased technical change measure (Violante 2008).
In the modern approach, the distinction between "skilled" and "unskilled labour" is usually based on years of schooling and higher education. 1 Adam Smith's use of these terms is partly, but not fully in line with the modern usage. Smith generally employs the term "common labour" for unskilled labour, that is, for labour which can be performed without first acquiring specific skills by way of education or professional training, apprenticeship, or learning-bydoing. As regards Smith's concept of "skilled labour", he saw two different types of learning or ways of acquiring skills to be involved: (formal) education and experience, i.e. "learningby-doing". Smith drew a strict analogy between an item of fixed physical capital ("a machine") and skilled labour power, and thus can be said to have anticipated the concept of "human capital": 2 When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expence of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expence of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the machine. (WN, I.x.b.6) Smith claimed that 'the difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common labour, is founded upon this principle' (WN, I.x.b.7). For Smith, a wage premium for skilled labour is thus a compensation for expenses incurred in the formation of "human capital".
However, Smith also recognized that some of these expenses are not incurred by individuals, but rather by the public at large, and that "human capital" is not merely a private capital, but also forms part of society's capital stock; compare Smith's treatment of the acquired skills of 1 However, for measuring skill-biased technical change by employing the (appropriately modified) Solovian production function approach 'it is not necessary to specify what makes a worker more skilled than another: it could be education, innate ability or experience' (Violante 2008: 8) . 2 See Spengler (1977) and Kurz and Salvadori (1995: 327-31 
The Pessimistic View
According to Adam Smith, technical change increases (labour) productivity, real wages and employment and decreases prices, and therefore widens the extent of the market and raises wealth and prosperity. Hence, for Smith technical change is a success story close to Pareto superiority, were it not for a strong bias against skilled labour. Smith is rather optimistic that discharged craftsmen will more or less "immediately" find a new employment or may even see only their task changed in their former occupation. But whereas in their former jobs the craftsmen had to command and perform various skills, the new jobs often consist only of a few simple and repetitive operations For Smith, technical change, which he identified with "increasing division of labour", is generally associated with both skill-reducing and skill-enhancing tendencies, at least in the early stages of the industrialization process. On the one hand, Smith emphasized that The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour. (WN, I.i.1) He also argued that particular professional skills are not primarily a result of natural differences in individual human capacities, that is, of "innate abilities", but rather emanate from learning-by-doing (or from learning-on-the-job):
The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions … is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. (WN, I.ii.4; emphasis added)
The increasing division of labour provides scope for gaining specialized experience, and thus for acquiring, developing, and enhancing particular skills. To the extent that it allows workers to gain such experience and to participate in the formation of such habits and customs, the increasing division of labour is skill-enhancing. On the other hand, however, Smith draws a most dismal picture of the impact of the division of labour on the "common labourer" when, in the context of a discussion of the need for public provision of education, he describes the consequences of industrial working conditions:
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. (WN, V.i.f.50)
The negative effects of the division of labour arise primarily from the fact that industrial production confines common workers to repetitive debilitating mechanical activity in the labour process -which, for Smith, is both caused by and also causing the replacement of workers by machinery:
The growth of labour productivity from division of labour is due to its making labourers like machines, with associated ill consequences for their intellectual and physical constitution, and their sensibilities. … It is this, really, which makes this specialization partly cause the invention of new machines: the resulting increase in the simplicity and repetitiveness -indeed, in the mechanical nature -of labour activity provides increasing scope for labour to be replaced with machines, including in this process the workers themselves perceiving potential innovations in machinery. (Aspromourgos 2009: 139) The observation that progress (division of labour) is strongly deskilling in 'nature' prompted Smith to write one of his most quoted paragraphs:
The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, […] has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment. … His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the laboring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.
In Smith's view technical change is complementary to labour as a whole -it increases employment -but this complementarity holds only for a certain kind of labour, namely for unskilled labour. At the same time technical progress -that is, the improvements and machinery that come with the increasing division of labour -are a substitute for skills. Thus, in Smith's view, technical change is predominantly unskilled-biased in "nature". 
Marx and Babbage
The most profound contributions on deskilling and skilling technical change were made by Karl Marx and Charles Babbage in the late 19 th century, when classical economic theory was on its peak. In line with Smith, Marx argues that technological change was predominantly deskilling. Skilled professionals are replaced by unskilled women, children or urban newcomers from rural areas. In sharp contrast to Smith, as it will be outlined later, Marx argues that technical change is not necessarily deskilling, but because of the strong bargaining power of skilled labourers, capitalists search for deskilling innovations in order to break the workers' bargaining power.
In analyzing the development from medieval handicraft to the modern factory system Marx distinguished between "manufactures" and "modern industry". "Division of labour and In the workshop the labour process was divided up into individual tasks, but the individual operations were still dependent on the skill of the workmen, and retained the character of a handicraft. Compared to "modern industry", manufactures still lack a number of important characteristics. First, full application of division of labour was prevented by the existence of a hierarchical organizational structure. Manufactures still required skilled workers ("specialized detail labourers"), and the number of unskilled labourers could not be extended beyond certain limits.
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Secondly, the application of scientific principles in the rationalization of the labour process was prevented by the narrow technical basis of handicraft, since all steps in the production process had to be capable of being carried out by hand. Third, the greatest disadvantage of the manufacturing division of labour was the 4 'The principal basis of manufacture [is] the separation of the labourer from his means of production, and the conversion of these means into capital. … The rules of the guilds, … by limiting most strictly the number of apprentices and journeymen that a single master could employ, prevented him from becoming a capitalist ' (1954 [1867] : 339).
'Although manufacture creates … a simple separation of the labourers into skilled and unskilled, simultaneously with their hierarchic arrangement in classes, yet the number of unskilled labourers, owing to the preponderating influence of the skilled, remains very limited. ' (1954 [1867] : 346) inability of capital to seize control of the whole labour time of manufacturing workers (Berg 1994: 63) .
Although Marx stressed the deskilling bias of the manufacturing system, 6 he noted that it also entails skill-enhancing and/or skill-changing elements: 'Manufacture, in fact, produces the skill of the detail labourer, by reproducing and systematically driving to an extreme within the workshop, the naturally developed differentiation of trades ' (1954 [1867] : 321). The detail labourer requires, and therefore acquires, very specific skills, compared to the artificer. But, according to Marx, the overall skill content is nevertheless reduced:
Manufacture begets, in every handicraft that it seizes upon, a class of so-called The novel element and characteristic feature of "modern industry" consist in the use of "machines" in the labour process, with far-reaching consequences:
Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in handling it passes over to the machine. … Thereby the technical foundation on which is based the division of labour in Manufacture, is swept away. …The organized group, peculiar to 6 'The greater division of labour enables one worker to do the work of five, ten or twenty … Labour is simplified. The special skill of the worker becomes worthless. Therefore, as labour becomes more unsatisfying, more repulsive, competition increases and wages decrease.' manufacture, is replaced by the connexion between the head workman and his few assistants. The essential division is, into workmen who are actually employed on the machines … and into mere attendants (almost exclusively children) of these workmen. In addition … there is a numerically unimportant class of persons, whose occupation it is to look after the whole of the machinery and repair it from time to time; such as engineers, mechanics, joiners, &c. This is a superior class of workmen, some of them scientifically educated, others brought up to a trade; it is distinct from the operating class. But it is little noticed that Marx also suggested that this was already beginning to change, because the 'technical basis' of modern industry is inherently 'revolutionary' rather than conservative:
Modern industry … is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production but also in the functions of the labourer … Modern industry, by its 7 'The special skill of each individual insignificant factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces, and the mass of labour that are embodied in the factory mechanism. ' (1954 [1867] For Marx, then, modern industry necessitated, and therefore would soon also enforce, the development of a better educated, less specialized, and more flexibly deployable workforce:
Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers. (1954 [1867] : 45) First signs of this change were already visible, Marx argued, in the early 1860s in terms of the establishment of technical and agricultural schools, which were introduced in order to prepare the workforce for more varied and more complicated tasks to be performed (ibid.).
A more Optimistic View
Marx was very pessimistic about the deskilling bias of technical change, at least with regard to the phase of the manufacturing division of labour and the early phase of modern industry. 
Empirical Evidence for Skill-biased and Deskilling Technical Change
In the last two decades there has been a growing empirical interest in the 18 This would support the hypothesis that technical change was deskilling during the first industrialization. Of course, using changes in legislation as an indicator is problematic, as the political process is often detached from economic realities and it is difficult to know what were the 'real' causes behind changes, and why they occurred at particular points in time.
Patents are a another widely used indicator for ascertaining technical change biases. MacLeod A recently very frequently used indicator for skill-biased technical change is the wage premium. The idea is that if wages for skilled workers are increasing faster than those for unskilled ones, this may be taken as an indicator that because of skill-biased technological change demand for skilled workers has increased faster than that for unskilled labourers. In addition to patent system studies, Smith's deskilling hypothesis is underpinned by data on the development of the "skill premium", which dropped sharply around 1730 in England th century industrialization process we find few innovations which have been unambiguously deskilling or skill-enhancing in nature. Most of them rather increased the demand for particular skills, which frequently had to be newly acquired, and at the same time made others redundant. Hence, industrialization led simultaneously to skilled labour shortages and a huge "Lumpenproletariat".
The Induction of Biased Technological Change
We found that many classical economists believed that technical change was predominantly deskilling during the 18th and 19th century.However, these authors put forward different views on what caused this bias. In accordance with recent discussions on technological change biases, the classical authors' views can be divided into two categories: those who argue that the bias is determined exogenously by technological trends and those who regard the bias as being endogenously determined by various socio-economic factors.
In the recent literature the increased demand for skilled labour is seen by some authors as arising from a specific General purpose technology: new communication technologies, which are skill-biased "by nature", while others hold that an increase in the relative supply of skilled labour has induced capital goods producers to direct their R&D activities towards developing new, more skilled labour complementary technologies. In a similar way, some classical authors also argued that the division of labour, mechanization and industrialization simply happened to have a particular technological bias "by nature", while others suggested that social and economic factors, such as relative factor endowments, strikes, bargaining power, etc., have at least co-determined the direction of technical change.
Biased Technological Change as an Unintended By-Product of Progress
In Smith's view, the increasing division of labour was caused by enlarged markets which made it necessary to increase productivity in order to supply the rising demand. At the same time, increased division of labour and rising labour productivity also boosted demand because of falling commodity prices. Thus the increasing division of labour is both induced by enlarged markets and also inducing the enlargement of markets (see Brugger 2013: 9 ff.). In Smith's view, the deskilling bias of technical change was neither induced by an increasing endowment with unskilled labourers nor by attempts at breaking the wage bargaining power of skilled workers, but was rather an unintended by-product of the new production organization. Hence Smith takes the deskilling nature of technical progress as exogenously given. This view has been challenged by some studies, which argue that factor endowments were an important incentive to innovate in certain directions already in the late 18 th and early 19 th century.
Induced Technical Change and Relative Factor Supplies
In much of the recent literature relative factor endowments are considered to be the main driving force for the direction of technical change and ithas been suggested that a comparison between England and the USA indicates that the technical change bias was strongly influenced by relative factor endowments already in the 19 th century. Because in the USA the relative skilled labour endowment was higher than in Britain, the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour was much smaller in the USA than in England (cf. Clark 1916: 392). Owing to relatively 'cheaper' skilled labour in the USA, more machinery requiring skilled labour for its operation was developed and used than in England (Thomas 1954 ' (2009: 55) . According to Allen, the high wage economy was caused by the commercial expansion that preceded the early industrialization. It meant that many English could afford more education for their children, since in England 'apprenticeship … was the standard way of conveying craft skills. Typically, parents had to make a lump-sum payment to a master when their child was taken on, and the ability to save this sum was eased when incomes were high ' (2009: 262) . The prevalence of 'high wages facilitated all sorts of skill acquisition. … Widespread literacy, numeracy and craft competence reflected the demand for skills in the advanced economies, and the high wages those economies generated gave workers the money to pay for schooling and apprenticeships ' (2009: 55-56) . As a consequence, 'eighteenth-century Britain was much more abundantly endowed with human capital, and that is an important reason for the technological breakthroughs of the period. … Britain had more inventors because the population became more literate, numerate and skilled ' (2009: 238-9 ). Allen agrees with Mokyr (2002) , that 'the Industrial Revolution would have come to naught if the vital few had not been supported by second-and third-tier inventors, who made the micro-inventions that improved the efficiency and extended the scope of the macro-inventions ' (2009: 240) . The key to British technological success was that its rich endowment of competent skilled artisans gave it a comparative advantage in micro-inventions (2009: 258) .
But eighteenth century high wages not only provided the means for more skill acquisition, but also strong incentives for introducing labour-saving technologies. In the period from 1760 to 1830, Allen argues, 'innovation in the British cotton industry relentlessly saved labour, the scarce and expensive factor of production ' (2009: 184) .
Allen further suggests to divide the innumerable inventions of the British industrial revolution into "macro-inventions", which are associated with technological breakthroughs due to new scientific or technical knowledge, and "micro-inventions", which consist of adaptations and minor improvements due to "local learning". The former, he argues, exhibited a particular bias, which made them suitable only for Britain but not for Continental Europe: High wages and cheap energy led to the invention of labour-saving and energy-intensive (i.e. coalintensive) technologies. But the subsequent "micro-inventions" then exhibited no particular bias anymore:
In their youth, they [the inventions] were decidedly British in their biases. As they matured, these biases wore away, and the inventions were adapted to any circumstances. At that point, the Industrial Revolution diffused to the continent [and] to North America … This life span took a century and a half. (2009: 136) Allen seeks to support his thesis by focusing on selected examples of British microinventions. One such example is the self-acting mule which was invented in the late 1820s by Richard Roberts: 'His aim was to eliminate the jobs of the high wage spinners who had operated the mules, and in that he succeeded -thus providing a neat example of factor prices directing invention. ' (2009: 208) Allen is well aware of the standard objection to factor-price induced technical change: Profitmaximising firms are interested in reducing unit production costs in general and therefore are indifferent between saving capital or labour.
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He seeks to address this objection -rather insufficiently -by emphasizing 'the cost of R&D and the expectations about the bias of the resulting technology ' (2009: 137) . He is clear about the fact that implicit in this analysis is the idea that firms undertaking R&D knew what they were aiming at, at least in economic terms. It would be hard to argue with this assumption in the case of the inventions that increased the use of coal, for they were clearly aimed at changing factor proportions in the direction of a cheaper input. The assumption is not as immediately obvious in the case of machines. Was 8 Allen rightly notes that 'a high wage might not imply high labour costs if the high wage workers were more productive than the low wage workers ' (2009: 143) . He fails to note, however, that because in standard neoclassical theory in equilibrium each factor must be remunerated according to its marginal productivity, there is no incentive to direct the R&D activity towards the saving of any particular factor (Salter 1960) . For a critical discussion of the neoclassical approach to induced technical change see Brugger and Gehrke (2017) . 
Deskilling Innovations as a Weapon in the Class Struggle
Unlike the recent contributions to biased technological change, some classical economists have argued that the endogenous bias of technological change is not caused by relative factor endowments and factor prices, but is also, and perhaps mainly, an instrument for raising the capitalists' bargaining power in the wage struggle. As outlined above, one-hundred years after Smith, Marx also diagnosed predominantly deskilling tendencies of technical change. But unlike Smith, for whom the deskilling bias is an unintended by-product of the increasing division of labour, Marx sees technical deskilling as a bourgeois weapon in the class struggle:
By substituting them by machines capitalists deliberately seek to reduce skilled workers' bargaining power. Down-graded machinists are easy to replace by unskilled workers, including women and children, and therefore have a much weaker bargaining position than highly specialised and well-trained workers. In times of high strike frequency capitalists get shown quite plainly that specialised skilled workers are pivotal for production and difficult to replace quickly. Therefore, following Marx, strikes induced capitalists to search for deskilling The apparent recalcitrance of nineteenth-century English labor, especially skilled labor, in accepting the discipline and the terms of factory employment provided an inducement to technical change. …The view was widely expressed in nineteenthcentury England, … that strikes were a major reason for innovations. …We have, moreover, the evidence of numerous inventors themselves, who testified that they undertook the search process which led to a particular invention as the result of a strike or the threat of a strike. (Rosenberg 1969: 12) According to Rosenberg, many skilled-labour-saving innovations appear irrational, at least from a short run perspective. Or, as Bruland put it, entrepreneurs based their choice of production methods not only on the production costs that are associated with a certain technique, but also took into account which kind of labour is needed to run a certain machinery, whether the needed workers are organized in unions or not, and whether they are The result of the R&D process was the invention of a self-acting mule. Hence further mechanization enabled capitalists to get rid of 'restive spinners, and to become once more master of his mill, which is no small advantage ' (ibid.: 365) . According to Ure, without those class struggles and the high costs they inflicted on the owners of the cotton mills further mechanization and displacement of skilled workers would not have taken place at this time.
Bruland (1982) confirms Ure's finding that 'within the British textile industry in the early nineteenth century, a direct causal relationship can be identified between particular arenas of industrial conflict and particular kinds of technical innovations. ' (Bruland 1982: 94) According to Bruland, also in the case of spinners, wool-combers and calico printers strikes have led to further mechanization and replacement of skilled workers:
We can thus understand certain specific avenues of technical change, and hence certain aspects of the technical structure of production, in terms of the struggles over power, control and distribution which are endemic within production systems in capitalist economies. (Bruland 1982: 94) Marx identified the manufacturing division of labour as an instrument of capitalists to gain power over the workers and control over the labour process. Numerous contributions to the "labour process" literature have pursued and confirmed Marx's perspective, both for the 19 th and the 20 th century . Harry Braverman (1974) , who started this stream of literature, applied it to explain the rise of a white-collar working class through the mechanization of office work, which led to the deskilling and displacing of clerical workers. In his classic study he also noted the importance of what has since been called the "Babbage Principle".
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It states that the master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into different processes, each requiring different degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity of both which is necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work were executed by one workman, that person must possess sufficient skill to perform the most difficult, and sufficient strength to execute the most laborious, of those operations into which the art is divided. (Babbage 1835:
175-6)
The underlying rationale of Babbage's principle is that a worker who performs high-skill tasks must receive a wage commensurate to his skill level, even though he regularly has to perform work of lower skill levels as well. If instead the labour process is divided among several workers, however, overall labour costs can be reduced by assigning only high-skill tasks to high-cost workers, and by limiting low-skill tasks to low-paid workers. According to Braverman, 'the most common mode of lowering the cost of labor is exemplified by the Babbage principle: break it up into its simplest elements. … The labor power capable of performing the process may be purchased more cheaply as dissociated elements than as a capacity integrated in a single worker. … Every step in the labor process is divorced, so far as possible, from special knowledge and training and reduced to simple labor. ' (Braverman 1974: 79-83 ) Along partly similar lines , Stephen Marglin (1974) has attempted to explain the 9 Although Braverman is frequently credited with having coined this term, it had in fact already been used by Alfred Marshall, who referred to it as 'Babbage's great principle of economical production, according to which every worker is set to the most difficult and important tasks of which he is capable, and only to those ' (1919: 149) . direction of technological and organizational change associated with the industrial revolution by 'the resort of economically and politically powerful classes to innovation in order to change the distribution of income in their favor (rather than to increase its size) ' (1974: 104) .
More specifically, he claimed that neither 'the minute division of labor that characterized the putting-out system' nor 'the development of the centralized organization that characterizes the factory system … took place primarily for reasons of technical superiority. Rather than providing more output for the same inputs, these innovations in work organization were introduced so that the capitalist got himself a larger share of the pie at the expense of the worker, and it is only the subsequent growth in the size of the pie that has obscured the class interest that was at the root of these innovations ' (1974: 62) .
Conclusion
Smith and Marx were very pessimistic with regard to deskilling tendencies of technical change. In Smith's view technical change appears to be predominantly deskilling. The lean empirical evidence we could find for Smith's lifetime confirms that many innovations have been deskilling in nature, but as well we find indicators for skill bias change. One hundred years later Marx stated that entrepreneurs deliberately search for deskilling innovations to break skilled workers bargaining power. On empirical grounds we found that in the late 19 th century strikes and other situations where entrepreneurs got shown skilled workers' bargaining power quite plainly gave them a strong incentive to search for bargaining power reducing -and thus deskilling -technical change. While for Smith the deskilling bias is an unintended by-product of technological change, Marx argues that under certain circumstances deskilling is the goal of innovations. Some classical authors -most notably Charles Babbage -argued that labelling 19 th century technological change just as deskilling is an untenable simplification. Artisans were not just replaced by unskilled machinists but also a variety of newly needed skills arose. Empirical evidence indicates that 19 th century technical change was accompanied by marked skill transformations -various skills became redundant while new ones arose -but we found no evidence that technical change was on average predominantly deskilling in this period. Hence, the often viewed opinion that 19 th century technical change had a strong overall bias against skilled labour may be due to a generalisation of catchy stories, but lacks empirical support. In fact, 19 th century technical change came with an extensive transformation of demanded skills rather than with a heavy deskilling bias.
